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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN*
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared with the intensive focus on juvenile justice issues
in Virginia between 1994 and 1996, and the significant statuto-
ry changes generated by that focus, the past two years have
been relatively serene, at least for juvenile law. Legislative
activity about juvenile justice has been subdued, and few cases
have interpreted the major legislative changes wrought during
that three-year period, or their effects. The 1998 legislative
session did result in the demise of the family court initially
created five years earlier contingent on the provision of ade-
quate funding for the court at some future session.1 The provi-
sion of funding for the court pursuant to that legislation was
delayed twice by the General Assembly, initially to July 1,
1996,2 and then to June 1, 1998.' No action was taken to im-
plement the authorizing act during the 1998 Session of the
Assembly and, thus, the enabling statutes lapsed.
The 1997 and 1998 legislative sessions did enact some major
revisions to the statutes governing the handling of child abuse
and neglect cases that will have a profound impact on such
matters, both procedurally and substantively. The legislation
will impact the process from the entry of emergency protective
orders through the termination of residual parental rights.
* This article did not appear in the 1997 Annual Survey of Virginia Law;
therefore, this current article will attempt to update developments occurring since the
1996 article. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Legal Issues Involving Children, 30 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1467 (1996). Because 1997 legislative changes have been in force for
well over a year, only the highlights of those amendments will be addressed.
** Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B-A., 1959, LL.B.,
1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. See Acts of Apr. 7, 1993, chs. 929, 930, 1993 Va. Acts 1422, 1464.
2. See Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 564, 1994 Va. Acts 789.
3. See Act of Apr. 5, 1996, ch. 616, 1996 Va. Acts 1076.
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These amendments arose partly in response to the 1996 amend-
ments to the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act 4 that accompanied its reauthorization in that year and the
subsequent enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997.5
In 1997, the Virginia General Assembly also finally enacted a
Parental Notice Act, requiring either notice to a parent or a
judicial order of bypass before an abortion may be performed on
a minor girl.' This occurred after almost two decades of debate,
and its timely implementation was authorized only after a
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit granted a stay of the decision by the federal district
court enjoining its enforcement.! The full court of appeals, sit-
ting en banc, ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the law
more than a year later in August of 1998.'
The United States Supreme Court addressed two troubling
issues regarding public education. In Agostini v. Felton,' the
court overruled an earlier decision so as to permit greater use
of public school teachers in religious schools under title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act." Then in Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District," the court provided
significant protection for local school officials from pupil law-
suits for sexual harassment by school employees. The Virginia
General Assembly also made some history in the education
arena during the 1998 Session by adopting charter school legis-
lation after several years of vigorous debate. 2
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5106i, 5116 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 673(B), 678, 679(B) (West Supp. 1998).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
7. See Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.
1997).
8. See Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.
1998) (en banc).
9. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
10. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-03 (West Supp. 1998).
11. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
12. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5 to -212.15 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
The two years following the significant juvenile justice enact-
ments of the 1996 Session of the Virginia General Assembly
have represented a period of relative repose, with few major
revisions to the juvenile code and few court decisions interpret-
ing the legislation of the previous four years. In 1997, however,
the General Assembly did enact a bill incorporating several
technical amendments to the more comprehensive 1996 revi-
sions. That bill, adopted as chapter 862," amended Virginia
Code section 16.1-255 to clarify the primary role of juvenile
intake officers in handling detention orders for juveniles, re-
gardless of whether they were initially issued by a judge or a
magistrate. 4 These amendments allowed intake officers to in-
formally handle complaints that juveniles are delinquent, in
need of supervision, or in need of services if the complaint is
not of a "violent juvenile felony" or the youth has "not previous-
ly been adjudicated in need of supervision or delinquent." 5
They also provided that a prosecutor's notice of intent to certify
the case to the circuit court must be "mailed or delivered to
counsel for the juvenile" or, if unrepresented, to the juvenile
and a parent or guardian. 6 Furthermore, the amendments
stated that a case can proceed in the juvenile court if that
court determines in a preliminary hearing that the youth is not
yet fourteen years old or, in a transfer hearing, that the neces-
sary notice has not been given, or that probable cause has not
been proven, or that the youth is not competent to stand tri-
al.17
The amendments also clarified that certification of charges to
the circuit court pursuant to subsections B and C of section
16.1-269.1 of the Virginia Code does not divest the juvenile
court of jurisdiction over unrelated matters or ancillary charges
properly within the court's jurisdiction. 8 The amendments fur-
ther specified that hearings in appeals to the circuit court in
13. Act of Apr. 2, 1997, ch. 862, 1997 Va. Acts 2299.
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-255 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
15. Id. § 16.1-260(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
16. Id. § 16.1-269.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
17. See id. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
18. See id.
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delinquency cases shall be public unless the juvenile waives the
right to a public trial.19 The amendments further stated that
the circuit court has the discretion to move a transferred juve-
nile from the detention facility to the jail, rather than being
required to do so,"° and allowed the Department of Juvenile
Justice to withdraw a DNA sample from juveniles committed to
the department.21
Other enactments amended section 16.1-263 to eliminate the
requirement of a summons or notification of a juvenile's parent
or guardian if their identity or location is not readily ascertain-
able as proven by judicial certification or an affidavit." The
amendments further clarified that the dispositions available for
children in need of services applied to juveniles determined to
be status offenders, such as curfew violators or tobacco offense
violators.' Another enactment allowed a court to consider a
report of an interdisciplinary team, which met not more than
ninety days prior to adjudication of a child in need of supervi-
sion, in lieu of directing that an interdisciplinary team be con-
vened,' provided that a court must find that bed space is
available and must consider a Department of Juvenile Justice
assessment of the appropriateness of a boot camp placement be-
fore committing a delinquent juvenile to such a facility.' Oth-
er changes required that Community Policy and Management
Teams participate in the development of community-based ser-
vices and allow the placement of children staffed under the
Comprehensive Services Act in a Virginia Juvenile Community
Crime Control Act program." It was also determined that ju-
19. See id. § 16.1-296(C1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
20. See id. § 16.1-269.6(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998); see also Jon Frank, Murder Sus-
pect, 14, -Moved From Jail Because of Assaults; Anthony Carter, Accused of Killing His
Half-Sister, was Bruised, Deputy Testifies, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 7, 1997, at B5
(reporting that one of the first 14-year-olds transferred to jail under the mandatory
provision of the 1996 legislation was assaulted in the Virginia Beach jail).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.3 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
22. See id. § 16.1-263(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998). This amendment appears to be in
response to the Virginia Court of Appeals' decision in Karim v. Commonwealth, 22
Va. App. 767, 473 S.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1996). See also text infra accompanying notes
45-46.
23. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-278.4 to -278.6 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
24. See id. § 16.1-278.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
25. See id. § 16.1-278.8(4a) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
26. See id. §§ 2.1-752, 16.1-286(A), 16.1-309.3 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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veniles charged with a "violent juvenile felony," as specified in
Virginia Code sections 16.1-269.1(B) and 16.1-269.1(C)7 should
be fingerprinted and photographed and that the juvenile's fin-
gerprints and a report of the disposition be sent to the Central
Criminal Records Exchange, subject to a later court order that
they be destroyed within six months if the youth is found not
guilty.S
Other changes required the reporting of "youth gang" infor-
mation to the Virginia Crime Information Network29 and pro-
vided that records concerning a juvenile charged with a "violent
juvenile felony" be open to the public." Another change man-
dated the disclosure of the disposition in marijuana gift or pos-
session cases to a school superintendent as well as in marijua-
na sale and distribution cases."' The Virginia Code has been
amended to authorize the Department of Juvenile Justice or a
Commonwealth's Attorney to release information to the public
about serious juvenile offenders who have escaped from the de-
partment or local facilities. 2 Further legislation changed the
statutory presumption that a child over ten but under fourteen
is not physically capable of rape by reducing the upper age
from fourteen to twelve." In addition, the Virginia Code made
escapes from a secure facility under contract with the Depart-
ment of Juvenile Justice punishable in the same manner as
escapes from public facilities.' Although perhaps numerous,
these changes were largely superficial.
The 1998 General Assembly session likewise made little im-
pact on the handling of delinquency matters. Amendments to
the juvenile code during the session made community service
boards responsible for conducting mental health assessments of
juveniles in secure facilities who are identified as needing such
27. Id. §§ 16.1-269.1(B), -269.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
28. See id. § 16.1-299 (Cu. Supp. 1998).
29. See id. § 16.1-299.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998). This section also defines "youth gang"
for reporting purposes and requires the Department of State Police to develop policies
and procedures for implementing the provision and to address the need for expunging
erroneously entered information.
30. See id. § 16.1-301 (Cur. Supp. 1998).
31. See id. § 16.1-305.1 (Cur. Supp. 1998).
32. See id. § 16.1-309.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
33. See id. § 18.2-61(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
34. See id. § 18.2-477.1 (Cur. Supp. 1998).
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an assessment and provided that the boards would be reim-
bursed out of funds appropriated to the Department of Juvenile
Justice.35 The legislature also changed the number of hours a
juvenile may be housed in a separate room in a jail or other
adult detention facility to six hours before and six hours after a
court hearing when the court orders the longer period."8 Prior
law limited the period to a maximum of six hours. Further-
more, the legislature granted the Board of Juvenile Justice,
instead of the Department of Corrections, the authority to certi-
fy juvenile detention facilities located upon the site of an adult
regional jail facility.37 New amendments also allowed the De-
partment of Juvenile Justice to obtain access to records elec-
tronically if the record is maintained by the court in that form,
and specified that when so transferred those records become
subject to the confidentiality provisions otherwise applicable to
the department's records. 8 Another amendment addressing
records provided that Commonwealth's attorneys and probation
officers can receive copies of juvenile records for preparation of
sentencing guidelines worksheets.3 9
Two bills clarified fiscal issues concerning the Virginia Juve-
nile Community Crime Control Act,4° and two others provided
for the appointment of alternate members for juvenile detention
or residential care facilities commissions.4 The legislature also
enabled detention facilities to charge the cost of capital con-
struction debt service less state reimbursement as part of the
cost that may be charged for housing a juvenile in such facili-
ties.42 Finally, the General Assembly made it an offense for a
juvenile over the age of thirteen, but under eighteen, to take
indecent liberties with a child under the age of fourteen who is
35. See id. § 16.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
36. See id. § 16.1-249 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
37. See id. § 16.1-249(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
38. See id. § 16.1-305(G) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
39. See id. § 16.1-305(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
40. See id. §§ 16.1-309.6, -309.8 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
41. See id. §§ 15.2-1535, 16.1-316 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
42. See id. § 16.1-322.4 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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at least five years the accused's junior.' The General Assem-
bly denominated this offense a Class 1 misdemeanor."
As is usually the case, the bulk of the appellate decisions
relating to delinquency during the period covered by this article
focused on transfer proceedings, and most involved cases that
arose under prior statutes. In Karim v. Commonwealth,45 the
Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to try the juvenile as an adult because the juvenile
court did not comply with the statutory parental notice require-
ments," and the parents were not present at the transfer
hearing. This failure to comply with the statute constituted. a
jurisdictional defect, and the circuit court could not try him.
In Williams v. Commonwealth,4' the juvenile court's failure
to give notice of the juvenile's transfer hearing to his mother
likewise was a jurisdictional defect depriving the circuit court of
jurisdiction to try him after transfer. Notice that the Code re-
quires more than simply the issuance of a summons. The fail-
ure to obtain service on the mother and her consequential ab-
sence at the transfer hearing were fatal.
In Winston v. Commonwealth," another case challenging the
jurisdiction of the circuit court after a preliminary hearing in
the general district court, the defendant contended that he was
not yet eighteen when the offenses -were committed; therefore,
the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the charges
against him. Despite conflicting evidence regarding Winston's
age at the time of commission of the offenses, he stated his age
as nineteen at his arraignment, and never subsequently pro-
43. See id. § 18.2-370.01 (Cure. Supp. 1998). Despite the designation as a Class 1
misdemeanor, the fact that it is an offense only for persons under the age of 18
would make it a status offense under the juvenile code definitions. See id § 16.1-228
(Repl. Vol. 1996).
44. See id. § 18.2-370.01 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
45. 22 Va. App. 767, 473 S.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1996).
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
47. 26 Va. App. 776, 497 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1998). In the course of his opinion
in the case, Judge Overton stated that "Ijiuveniles have been afforded many of the
same constitutional guarantees as adults. Indeed, 'society's special concern for child-
ren' leads us to a more vigorous examination of proceedings where the young have
been accused of violating the law." Id. at 780, 497 S.E.2d at 158 (citing Kent v. Unit-
ed States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, (1966)).
48. 26 Va. App. 746, 497 S.E.2d 141 (Ct. App. 1998).
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duced credible evidence to rebut that assertion. Thus, the cir-
cuit court had jurisdiction to try him.49
In still another challenge to a circuit court's jurisdiction over
a juvenile, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that prior to the
1994 legislative changes, the action of the Commonwealth to
nolle prosequi indictments required that the charges be initiat-
ed again by a petition in the juvenile court. ° The 1996 Virgin-
ia Code revisions now allow the case to be reinstated by indict-
ment in the circuit court if the nolle prosequi occurs after in-
dictment. 51
In Panameno v. Commonwealth,52 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia determined that in the absence of any affirmative asser-
tion of incompetency by a juvenile defendant in a 'transfer or
certification hearing, the juvenile court is not required to make
an explicit finding of competency.53 In Price v. Common-
wealth,54 the Virginia Court of Appeals concluded that where
the juvenile court transferred Price for trial as an adult and
remanded him to jail, there was necessarily the finding of prob-
able cause that triggered the start of the five-month limit for
trial under the speedy trial statute. The court dismissed the
charges and held that the action of the circuit court in quash-
ing the initial indictments did not affect the running of the
time.55
In three unpublished opinions concerning transfers, the
Virginia Court of Appeals concluded in one opinion that the
failure of a juvenile court to forward all papers connected with
a case to the circuit court in an appeal of transfer was not a
jurisdictional defect.5" In another case, the court of appeals
49. See id. at 750, 497 S.E.2d at 143; see also Penn v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 981
(W.D. Va. 1967); Winston v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. Cir. 497 (Richmond City 1997).
In the Penn case, the district judge denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
the prisoner by deciding that Penn had waived his right to challenge jurisdiction by
his earlier misrepresentation that he was eighteen years old. See Penn, 270 F. Supp.
at 984.
50. See Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 38, 49, 473 S.E.2d 724, 730 (Ct.
App. 1996).
51. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
52. 255 Va. 473, 498 S.E.2d 920 (1998).
53. See id. at 475, 498 S.E.2d at 921.
54. 25 Va. App. 655, 492 S.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1997).
55. See id. at 655, 492 S.E.2d at 447.
56. See Reid v. Commonwealth, No. 1175-95-1, 1996 WL 363568, at *1 (Va. Ct.
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determined that there was no evidence that a circuit court
judge failed to review the transfer documents in a case where
there was a typographical error on one transfer order.5 7 In a
third decision, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's
failure to provide an allegedly exculpatory statement of a co-
conspirator prior to a transfer hearing did not deny the youth a
proper transfer hearing because the statement was not material
to the transfer issues." In Broadnax v. Commonwealth,59 the
Virginia Court of Appeals also determined that, where a juve-
nile had been tried as an adult in 1994 for robbery following
transfer, even though he was acquitted, the juvenile court had
no jurisdiction over the youth for 1995 charges. The court rea-
soned that Virginia Code section 16.1-271 divested the court of
future jurisdiction where the juvenile has been tried or treated
as an adult." In Wright v. Angelone,6 ' the federal court re-
fused to grant habeas corpus relief to a Virginia juvenile defen-
dant sentenced to 'death for murder because the allegations of
non-compliance with the juvenile transfer statutes had been
considered by state courts. The court stated that even erroneous
rulings would not be wrongs of constitutional dimensions under
the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.2
Two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit also dealt with transfer for adult handling in the
federal system. In United States v. NJB,' the court concluded
that the government's certification that NJB was charged with
a "crime of violence" was correct because murder in furtherance
of a continuing criminal enterprise is a violent crime and not
merely a penalty enhancement." The court further concluded
App. July 2, 1996) (unpublished decision).
57. See I-ite v. Commonwealth, No. 2268-95-1, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 652, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1996) (unpublished decision).
58. See Dara v. Commonwealth, No. 2795-95-1, 1997 WL 52421, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 1997) (unpublished decision).
59. 24 Va. App. 808, 485 S.E.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1997).
60. See id. at 815, 485 S.E.2d at 669; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Repl.
Vol. 1996). It would appear that this divestiture would occur at indictment in the
circuit court pursuant to transfer or certification.
61. 151 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
62. See id. at 158; see also 28 U.S.C-A. § 2254(D) (West 1994).
63. 104 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1997).
64. See id. at 633-35.
1998] 1353
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1345
that a "substantial federal interest" clearly exists where the
legislative history of the delinquency statute expressly included
"large-scale drug trafficking" as an example of such interest."
There is no requirement that the government certify that the
juvenile records are complete." Finally, the court found that a
state court adjudication for felony escape constituted a finding
of guilt for a crime of violence. 7 In United States v. White,"
the court disavowed dictum in NJB that the government must
prove a "substantial federal interest" in connection with prongs
(1) and (2) of 18 U.S.C. § 5302 and held that only prong (3)
requires such proof. 9
In Jackson v. Commonwealth," a sixteen-year-old juvenile's
police interrogation was deemed to have been conducted proper-
ly because his confession was voluntary and secured after ad-
vice of his Miranda rights. He was questioned on four separate
occasions for less than nineteen hours with the longest session
lasting about one hour and twenty minutes. He was not enti-
tled to the presence of his mother during the interrogation, and
the alleged police delay in giving her access to her son did not
undermine the admissibility of the confessions. The Supreme
Court of Virginia also ruled that the death penalty can be con-
stitutionally imposed on a sixteen-year-old. 7' Justice Hassell
dissented from the death sentence review, concluding that
Jackson's sentence to death was disproportionate to other -juve-
nile capital murder defendants and that the supreme court's
sentence review for juveniles should look at other juvenile capi-
tal prosecutions rather than capital defendants generally.72
65. See id. at 635.
66. See id. at 636.
67. See id.
68. 139 F.3d 998 (4th Cir. 1998).
69. See id. at 1000.
70. 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998).
71. See id. at 647, 499 S.E.2d at 552.
72. 255 Va. at 652-55, 499 S.E.2d at 555-57 (Hassell, J., dissenting). Justice
Hassell looked at ten convictions of sixteen-year-olds for capital murder since 1987
and noted that this was the first death sentence. A Norfolk circuit court decision
concludes that a fifteen-year-old can be tried and convicted of capital murder but may
not be sentenced to death in light of the United States Supreme Court case of
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 41
Va. Cir. 584, 587 (Norfolk City 1994).
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia only dealt with one juvenile
confession case other than Jackson during the time covered by
this article.7" There, they again upheld the admissibility of a
statement obtained as a result of lengthy interrogation with
false statements made to the juvenile by the police. 4 In
Suleiman v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals decided
that the youth was properly sentenced by the circuit court as a
serious juvenile offender pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-
285.1. After the juvenile court refused to transfer the case,
Suleiman appealed the juveiile disposition and was convicted of
robbery in the circuit court. The court's written findings in the
case satisfied the requirements of the statute by reciting the
statutory language; it was not necessary to make more expan-
sive factual findings. The evidence that defendant was the
"mastermind" behind the robbery, stole the weapons used in the
offense, declined to accept responsibility for the crime, and
showed no remorse indicated that he "was not a proper person
for non-incarceration juvenile programs .... 7 In an unpub-
lished decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the
record showed that a circuit court gave proper consideration to
juvenile dispositional possibilities before sentencing the youth
as an adult after he waived a transfer hearing, in spite of some
ambiguous statements by the judge.77
Commonwealth v. Jackson'5 involved an adult matter, but
the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision on the standard for
expungement of the conviction is relevant to juvenile pro-
ceedings. The court ruled that dismissal of a charge pursuant to
the satisfactory completion of terms of a deferred judgment does
not make a case "otherwise dismissed" for the purpose of Vir-
ginia Code sections 19.2-151 and 19.2-392.2."9 The same lan-
73. See Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1, 1996 WL 666739, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 1996) (unpublished decision).
74. See id. at *2. The court specifically relied on its earlier decision in Novak v.
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 457 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1995), where there were
similar circumstances and holdings. See generally Ellen R. Fulmer, Comment, Novak
v. Commonwealth: Are Virginia Courts Providing Special Protection to Virginia's Juve-
nile Defendants?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 935 (1996).
75. 26 Va. App. 506, 495 S.E.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1998).
76. Id. at 513, 495 S.E.2d at 536.
77. See Pressley v. Commonwealth, No. 3019-96-4, 1998 WL 8507, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Jan. 13, 1998) (unpublished decision).
78. 255 Va. 552, 499 S.E.2d 276 (1998).
79. See id. at 556, 499 S.E.2d at 279; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-151, -392.2
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guage is used in section 16.1-306(C) of the juvenile code govern-
ing expungement of juvenile adjudications."
The Virginia Court of Appeals concluded in Harris v. Com-
monwealth"' that an adult defendant's due process rights were
not violated by the admission of his prior juvenile record during
the sentencing hearing, despite his contention that "the proce-
dures attendant to juvenile proceedings render these adjudica-
tions so unreliable that it is fundamentally unfair to consider
them during the sentencing phase of later adult criminal prose-
cutions."82 The court deemed this contention invalid and held
that the prior juvenile record was properly admitted and consid-
ered.' In Dodson v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of
Appeals ruled that the defendant's due process rights were not
violated by the admission of a 1969 conviction, while under age
eighteen, as the predicate offense behind his conviction for
attempting to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a
felony, because the 1969 action was an adult conviction and not
a juvenile adjudication.'
In Oxenham v. J.S.M.,88 the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
versed a circuit court's decision to grant a writ of prohibition
against a juvenile court judge, who chose to appoint indepen-
dent attorneys as counsel and as guardian ad litem for a ten-
year-old defendant charged with assaulting his mother, despite
the objections of his parents. The parents wanted their respec-
tive divorce attorneys to represent the youth. The juvenile court
clearly had jurisdiction over the delinquency charge and
possessed the authority to appoint counsel for the young man
so. the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition was not
proper.8"
In another significant case, the Virginia Court of Appeals
ruled that a juvenile judge had the authority to order the local
(Cum. Supp. 1998).
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-306(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
81. 26 Va. App. 794, 497 S.E.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1998).
82. Id. at 807, 497 S.E.2d at 171.
83. See id.
84. 23 Va. App. 286, 476 S.E.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1996).
85. See id. at 295-98, 476 S.E.2d at 517-18.
86. 256 Va. 180, 501 S.E.2d 765 (1998).
87. See id. at 185, 501 S.E.2d at 768.
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department of social services to provide treatment in a residen-
tial facility for a juvenile in their custody based upon a deter-
mination that she qualified for services pursuant to a report
issued by a Family Assessment and Planning Team." The
court of appeals ruled in Wilson v. Commonwealth" that a ju-
venile defendant could be summarily punished for criminal
contempt for disobeying court orders, decrees, and processes
without the formal filing of a juvenile petition.0 Additionally,
the court held that while there was no need to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem in addition to counsel, the trial court's order sen-
tencing the juvenile to "jail" had to be modified to reflect place-
ment in a juvenile detention facility, because a jail placement
was not legal.9
In another ruling, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that a
defendant was properly convicted of contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor by taking a sixteen-year-old girl to the
adult's home, where the girl spent the night-and engaged in
sexual relations-with defendant's son, without the permission
of her parents.92 Similarly, the Virginia Court of Appeals found
that a juvenile's mother could be held in contempt of a juvenile
court order issued in connection with a finding that her daugh-
ter was in need of supervision if the defendant refused to get
ordered alcohol treatment and undermined the daughter's resi-
dential treatment program."
A federal district court upheld a Charlottesville curfew ordi-
nance, despite a constitutional attack in a suit requesting an
88. See S.G. v. Prince William County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 25 Va. App. 356, 488
S.E.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1997). The Family Assessment and Planning Team ("FAPT) was
created pursuant to the Comprehensive Services Act for at Risk Youth and Families.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-745 to -759.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998). The General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 2.1-757 to permit a court to make a disposition other
than that recommended by the FAPT and those services will qualify for funding.
89. 23 Va. App. 318, 477 S.E.2d 7 (Ct. App. 1996).
90. See id. at 323, 477 S.E.2d at 9.
91. See id. at 326, 477 S.E.2d at 10. Pursuant to the authority in sections 16.1-
249(B) and 16.1-292 of the Virginia Code, the court of appeals appropriately modified
the juvenile's sentence. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-249(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998); id. §
16.1-292 (Repl. Vol 1996).
92. See Wathins v. Commonwealth, No. 975-96-3, 1997 WL 221454, at *2 (Va. Ct.
App. May 6, 1997) (unpublished decision).
93. See Hanson v. Commonwealth, No. 2899-95-3, 1997 WL 147454, at *4 (Va. Ct.
App. Apr. 1, 1997) (unpublished decision).
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injunction, where the judge concluded that the city had estab-
lished that the ordinance reflected a justifiable effort to protect
youth in the city and to reduce a high level of juvenile crime.94
Here, the city's evidentiary showing was viewed as stronger
than that offered in Hutchins v. District of Columbia," a fed-
eral district court decision overturning the Washington, D.C.
curfew ordinance several months earlier.
In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,96 the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990,"7 which prohibits discrimination
by a "public entity against a qualified individual.with a disabil-
ity," based on that disability, applies to an inmate in a state
correctional facility who claimed he had been denied admissioh
to a boot camp program because of his history of hyperten-
sion. 8 Although this case dealt with an adult prisoner, it has
significant relevance to juvenile correctional programs where
there are frequently youths with disabilities.99
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Alexander S. v.
Boyd"00 that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199501 ap-
plied to limit attorneys' fees for successful litigation challenging
conditions in state juvenile facilities, as well as for adult pris-
ons.102 In addition, the Act could be applied retroactively to
litigation that preceded its adoption where the award of fees
takes place after the effective date of the Act.'
The Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice adopted new
Length-of-Stay Guidelines ("Guidelines") to govern the length of
time a juvenile could spend in a correctional facility pursuant
to an indeterminate commitment to the Department of Juvenile
Justice by a juvenile or circuit court."°4 The new Guidelines
94. See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997).
95. 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996).
96. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
97. 42 U.S.CA. § 12131(1XB) (West 1995).
98. See Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1952.
99. See, e.g., Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., ed., Children with Disabilities in the Juve-
nile Justice System: Overview of the Special Education Process, JUVENILE LAW AND
PRACTICE IN VIRGINIA 445-46 (Supp. 1996).
100. 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997).
101. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
102. See Alexander, 113 F.3d at 1392.
103. See id.
104. See GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF STAY OF JUVENILES INDE-
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supersede those approved in 1995 and 1996, and they establish
four levels of offenses based on the severity and chronicity of
the offense to ultimately establish an early and late release
date for each level of offending and chronicity. The new Guide-
lines increase the lengths of stay from a range of thirty to sixty
days for the prior lowest level to a range of six months to
twelve months for the new lowest level offense, and from eigh-
teen months to thirty-six months for the highest level, exclud-
ing murder, to a new range of twenty-four months to thirty-six
months. There may also be a three-month reduction or increase
for "exceptional aggravating or mitigating circumstances,"
10 5
and the length of stay may be adjusted for certain mandatory
treatment assignments.0 6 These Guidelines, and their inter-
pretation, will have a profound effect on the length of timd a
juvenile may be incarcerated pursuant to an indeterminate:-
commitment to the department.
III. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION
OF RESIDUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
The major legislative developments during 1997 in the area
of abuse and neglect included the adoption of an amendment to
Virginia Code section 16.1-241(A)(6), which excludes from the
description of those parties "with a legitimate interest" in filing
a petition for custody, visitation, or other purposes, any individ-
uals whose parental rights have been terminated or any other
person whose interest is derived from that individual.' 7 An-
other amendment to the Virginia Code allows Court-Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA) programs to directly 'access criminal
background checks on their volunteers.' Equally important is
the repeal of the "sunset" provision in section 16.1-266.2 so as
to allow the coptinued appointment of pro bono counsel for
alleged victims in family abuse cases where protective orders
TERMINATELY COMMITED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (adopted on
February 11, 1998, and effective on July 1, 1998, pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 66-
10(8) (Cure. Supp. 1998)).
105. Id. S IVA3.b.
106. See id. S IV.B.
107. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241(A)(6), 20-124.1, 63.1-233 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
108. See id. §§ 9-173.8, 19.2-389 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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are sought."° More changes to the Virginia Code include the
amendment of Virginia's "Megan's Law" to add additional of-
fenses requiring re-registration of sex offenders at regular inter-
vals and other procedural changes, 10 a new provision that
states that the willful killing of an unborn fetus under certain
circumstances is murder,"' and the addition of a person stand-
ing in loco parentis to the list of those individuals who may be
guilty of pandering if they allow a person in their charge to be
used for prostitution or illicit sex."2
The most significant changes in 1998 were occasioned by the
adoption of a bill to standardize and speed up the process of
protecting abused and neglected children."' This bill amended
several sections and enacted a new one to allow for a vast
array of legislative changes. The new section allows the entry of
a protective order during a preliminary removal order hear-
ing"4 and further mandates that an adjudicatory hearing is to
be held within thirty days of a preliminary removal hearing or
a hearing on a request for a preliminary protective order."' If
a determination of abuse or neglect is made, then a disposi-
tional hearing must be held within forty-five days, and the
foster care plan and protective orders are to be reviewed at the
dispositional hearing."8 Any orders entered after such a hear-
ing are final and appealable."' Additional provisions in the
newly created section include the ideas that independent living
may be a permanent goal for a child of sixteen years or old-
er,"' foster care review hearings are to be held six months
after the dispositional hearing rather than twelve months-,.
permanency planning hearings, a new stage of the process, are
to be held within eleven months after the foster care review
109. See id. § 16.1-266.2 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cure. Supp. 1998).
110. See id. §§ 18.2-47 to -48, 19.2-298.1 to -298.4, 19.2-390 (Cum. Supp. 1998); id.
§§ 53.1-116.1, -160.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
111. See id. §§ 18.2-31, -32.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
112. See id. § 18.2-355 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
113. Act of Apr. 2, 1997, ch. 790, 1997 Va. Acts 1922.
114. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-252(F) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
115. See id. §§ 16.1-252(G) to -253(F) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
116. See id. §§ 16.1-252(H) to -253(G), -278.2(B) to (C) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
117. See id. § 16.1-278.2(D) to -296(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
118. See id. § 16.1-281(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
119. See id. § 16.1-282(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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hearing,2 and guardians ad litem, as well as CASA volun-
teers, are to have access to relevant medical, school and state
agency records.'2'
Amendments to the law in 1998 further revised the processes
for dealing with familial abuse and neglect cases by providing
that preliminary protective orders may be entered in the course
of any proceedings before the court and on the motion of any
person, whether ex parte or sua sponte.' If an ex parte pre-
liminary protective order is issued, the court must include an
affidavit or a summary of the allegations and findings in its or-
der.". Additionally, an adjudicatory hearing is to be held
within thirty days of the initial preliminary protective order
hearing,' during which the health and safety of the child are
to be the paramount concerns in the development and imple-
mentation of the foster care plan." Furthermore, the court
may hear and decide a petition for termination of residual pa-
rental rights at the same hearing where the foster care plan is
approved.'
Termination of parental rights is authorized if a parent has
been convicted of murder or other homicide-related offenses
involving a child of the parent or with whom the parent resid-
ed, or for felony sexual or serious physical assaults in such a
situation.'27 Parental rights may also be terminated for failing
to maintain continuing contact with a child for six months
rather than the previous twelve-month time period and if such
rights have been' terminated for a sibling." Finally, foster
parents are entitled to notice of proceedings regardless of the
length of time they had taken care of the child."
Once these preliminary matters are resolved, the new guide-
lines provide that an agency having authority to place a child
120. See id. § 16.1-282.1 (Cure. Supp. 1998).
121. See id. § 16.1-266(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
122. See id. § 16.1-253(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
123. See id.
124. See id. § 16.1-253(F) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
125. See id. § 16.1-281(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
126. See id.
127. See id. § 16.1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
128. See id. 88 16.1-283(CX1), -283(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
129. See id. § 16.1-282(C)(4) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
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for adoption following termination must file a report with the
court every six months until a final adoption order is en-
tered,3 0 appeals of termination cases to the Virginia Court of
Appeals are to be given priority on the court's docket,'3' and
while an appeal is pending, the juvenile court retains juris-
diction to hear foster care review and permanency planning
petitions.
3 2
The General Assembly also provided that child protective
services workers or law enforcement officers have the authority
to take a child into custody for a maximum of seventy-two
hours without the prior approval of the parents if the evidence
of abuse is subject to deterioration before a hearing can be
held."s It also required hospitals to notify the community ser-
vices board in a woman's resident locale to appoint a discharge
plan manager if the woman is identified as a substance-abusing
postpartum woman so as to bring about implementation and
management of the plan.'" Finally, the General Assembly di-
rected the Department of Medical Assistance Services to provide
for the Medicaid payments of services for victims of child abuse
or neglect,' 35 and enacted comprehensive legislation mandating
health professionals to report, within seven days of a child's
birth, diagnoses of its exposure to a non-prescribed controlled
substance or of fetal alcohol syndrome, to child protective ser-
vices for investigation and possible petitioning of the juvenile
court for necessary and appropriate services.' 8
Once again, there were a significant number of court deci-
sions concerning abuse or neglect, and some of these cases have
major consequences for future proceedings. The Virginia. Court
of Appeals held in Herrera v. Commonwealth. that the earli-
er decision of Commonwealth v. Carter,3 8 ruling a portion of
the child endangerment statute unconstitutional, should be
applied retroactively to other cases pending on direct review
130. See id. § 16.1-283(G) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
131. See id. § 16.1-296(D) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
132. See id. § 16.1-242.1 (Cure. Supp. 1998).
133. See id. § 63.1-248.9 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
134. See id. § 32.1-127(BX6) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
135. See id. § 32.1-325(AX1) (Cure. Supp. 1998).
136. See id. §§ 16.1-241.3, 63.1-248.3, 63.1-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
137. 24 Va. App. 490, 483 S.E.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1997).
138. 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1995).
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and on cases not yet decided.39  In Commonwealth v.
Brew, 4° a circuit court ruled that contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor was not a lesser included offense of statutory
rape.' The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Jenkins v.
Commonwealth... that the court of appeals erred in concluding
that the trial court's admission of expert testimony regarding
the sexual abuse of a two-year-old child constituted harmless
error." A reversible error was committed by allowing a li-
censed clinical psychologist to testify that a child "had been
sexually abused."" The court also erred in permitting the
psychologist to testify that the boy had told the psychologist
that the boy had been "sexed." The admission of the
psychologist's testimony was erroneous because this hearsay
evidence did not fit within any recognized exception to the
hearsay rule.45
In Pavlick v. Commonwealth," a two-month-old child died
of head injuries as a result of the "shaken baby syndrome." The
father was convicted of the second degree murder of the in-
fant.47 The en banc Virginia Court of Appeals decided that
the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of rib fractures
between two to four weeks old and of a separate head injury
that occurred about four to eight days before the death.' The
prior injuries occurred during a time when either Pavlick had
sole physical custody of the infant or when the paternal grand-
mother was present. The grandmother testified without contra-
diction that she had never shaken the infant.' The evidence
of the prior injuries was relevant and the jury was entitled to
139. See Herrera, 24 Va. App. at 494, 483 S.E.2d at 494.
140. 43 Va. Cir. 611 (Richmond County 1996).
141. See id. at 613.
142. 254 Va. 333, 492 S.E.2d 131 (1997). For the prior history of the case, see 22
Va. App. 58, 471 S.E.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1996), and 21 Va. App. 222, 463 S.E.2d 330
(Ct. App. 1995).
143. See Jenkins, 254 Va. at 338, 492 S.E.2d at 134.
144. Id. at 336, 492 S.E.2d at 133-34.
145. See id. at 339, 492 S.E.2d at 134-35.
146. 27 Va. App. 219, 497 S.E.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1998), rev'g 25 Va. App. 538, 489
S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1997).
147. See id. at 223, 497 S.E.2d at 922.
148. See id. at 227, 497 S.E.2d at 924.
149. See id. at 225, 497 S.E.2d at 923.
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consider the evidence in determining the credibility of the
witnesses.'5
In Webber v. Commonwealth,'5' the evidence was deemed
sufficient to prove that a father had murdered his twenty-nine-
day-old son where the medical symptoms were consistent with
the "shaken baby syndrome" and where that diagnosis was
coupled with the father's inculpatory admissions.'52 The Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for sexual moles-
tation of an eleven-year-old girl in Blaylock v. Common-
wealth" because the trial court erred in excluding the prof-
fered testimony of two former neighbors of the victim that the
victim's reputation for truthfulness was bad in her old
neighborhood.'" The remoteness of the reputation evidence
was a matter of its probative value rather than its
admissibility.'55 The trial court also erred in admitting porno-
graphic images from Blaylock's computer involving children."
Thig evidence of other and prior "bad acts" would have been
relevant to prove intent, but intent was not an issue in the
case.'57 Testimony from the now grown victim's husband that
she had told him several years before that Blaylock had molest-
ed her was admissible to counter the contention that her testi-
mony was a recent fabrication. 55 In Marshall v. Common-
wealth,'59 the defendant's convictions for attempted object sex-
ual penetration and murder of his eight-month-old son were af-
firmed because the injuries occurred while the infant was with-
in his exclusive control and the medical evidence demonstrated
that they were not accidental.6 °
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Patrick v. Common-
wealth'' that the circumstantial evidence of penetration was
150. See id. at 229, 497 S.E.2d at 925.
151. 26 Va. App. 549, 496 S.E.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1998).
152. See id. at 561, 496 S.E.2d at 100.
153. 26 Va. App. 579, 496 S.E.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1998).
154. See id. at 585, 496 S.E.2d at 100.
155. See id. at 586, 496 S.E.2d at 100.
156. See id. at 592, 496 S.E.2d at 103-04.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 595, 496 S.E.2d at 105.
159. 26 Va. App. 627, 496 S.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1998).
160. See id. at 630, 496 S.E.2d at 122.
161. 27 Va. App. 655, 500 S.E.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1998).
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sufficient to support a conviction of statutory rape of an eleven-
year-old girl.'62 In Terry v. Commonwealth," however, the
conviction for carnal knowledge of a child was reversed where
the accused was questioned by a police officer and a social
worker in the jail without any notice to, or presence of, his
attorney after arraignment in violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights." A trial court did not violate the rights of a defen-
dant charged with forcible rape and sodomy of a sixteen-year-
old girl when it refused to permit questions of the jury venire
regarding whether any juror had ever caught a child in a
lie.16
The difficulties in communication by children in abuse and
neglect cases were illustrated in Moore v. Commonwealth,"
where the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that a young girl's
testimony that defendant had placed his penis on her vagina
was insufficient to prove penetration for the purpose of a prose-
cution for rape of a child under the age of thirteen.16 Similar-
ly, a lack of evidence of school achievement scores or similar
proof was fatal to a prosecution for rape of a fourteen-and-one-
half-year-old girl where the intercourse was consensual and she
was at the upper range of educable mental retardation but had
progressed in school with her peers." The evidence of mental
incapacity for the purpose of Virginia Code section 18.2-61 was
not sufficient. 169 The uncorroborated testimony of a thirteen-
year-old girl that her father had committed sexual acts on her
was sufficient to sustain the convictions in Hebden v. Common-
wealth,"' although only by an equally divided Virginia Court
of Appeals. The conviction was sustained even though the evi-
dencie was in conflict and there was testimony that the girl had
162. See id. at 663, 500 S.E.2d at 843.
163. 27 Va. App. 664, 500 S.E.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1998), reh'g granted and mandate
stayed by 28 Va. App. 237, 503 S.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1998).
164. See id. at 673, 500 S.E.2d at 848.
165. See Skipper v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 420, 429-30, 477 S.E.2d 754, 759
(Ct. App. 1996).
166. 254 Va. 184, 491 S.E.2d 739 (1997).
167. See id. at 189, 491 S.E.2d at 741.
168. See White v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 593, 597-98, 478 S.E.2d 713, 714-15
(Ct. App. 1996).
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
170. 26 Va. App. 727, 496 S.E.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1998), vacating 25 Va. App. 448,
489 S.E.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1997).
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reason to fabricate the complaint. 7' In Crawford v.
Commonwealth,7 ' the convictions for carnal knowledge and
crimes against nature were reversed where the victim's daugh-
ter was unable to testify clearly when the offenses occurred and
where the consequent amendments to the indictment should
have entitled the father to a continuance."'
A juvenile victim's complaint of rape made to her mother ten
months after the alleged rape was admissible under the "recent
complaint" exception to the hearsay rule74 where the delay is
explained by circumstances entirely consistent with both the
circumstances and the fact that the assault was on a child vic-
tim. 75 The lack of "recentness" of the complaint goes to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility."6 Simi-
larly, in Mitchell v. Commonwealth,'77 the Virginia Court of
Appeals ruled that rebuttal testimony by the brother of a
twelve-year-old victim of a sodomy proposal regarding state-
ments the victim made to him were admissible as a recent com-
plaint of sexual assault although it could not be admitted as a
prior consistent statement.'78 In a circuit court case, the judge
ruled that there was no exception to the "rape shield law""9
that would allow cross-examination of a child sexual assault
victim on her prior sexual experience, especially because that
alleged prior experience was dissimilar to what was alleged in
the case."s
In Holden v. Commonwealth, 8' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals ruled 'that the circuit court had properly revolked
defendant's suspended sentences for aggravated sexual battery
of a child where he had written letters graphically describing
171. See Hebden v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 448, 449-50, 489 S.E.2d 245, 246
(Ct. App. 1997).
172. 23 Va. App. 661, 479 S.E.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc), vacating 22 Va.
App. 663, 472 S.E.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996).
173. See id. at 666-67, 479 S.E.2d at 86-87.
174. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
175. See Terry v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 627, 636, 484 S.E.2d 614, 618 (Ct.
App. 1997).
176. See id. at 635-36, 484 S.E.2d at 618.
177. 25 Va. App. 81, 486 S.E.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1997).
178. See id. at 85-86, 486 S.E.2d at 553.
179. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
180. See Commonwealth v. Hagy, 41 Va. Cir. 51 (Roanoke City 1996).
181. 27 Va. App. 38, 497 S.E.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1998).
1366
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
his desire to have sex with children while a prisoner serving
time for an unrelated offense.'82 As usual, there also were sev-
eral other reported criminal cases where the victims were chil-
dren but where no significant issues were presented relating to
the age of the victims."
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Padilla v. Norfolk
Division of Social ServicesTM that the standard of proof in cas-
es establishing or modifying foster care plans is "preponderance
of the evidence."" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided in Renn v. Garrison"'M that social
workers who dealt with a family in trying to address problems
surrounding a troubled runaway teenage daughter had qualified
immunity in a suit alleging a deprivation of the family's consti-
tutional right to privacy.'87 Similarly, social workers have
qualified immunity in a mother's suit alleging they violated her
and her daughter's due process rights by. removing the daughter
to a foster home where the daughter died from abuse." In
Hawks v. Dinwiddie Department of Social Services,"9 the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals concluded that the circuit judge erred in
refusing to permit an eleven-year-old child to testify in a pro-
ceeding for the termination of the mother's residual parental
rights without first making an individualized factual determina-
tion as to whether he was of an "age of discretion."9 ' A cir-
cuit court in a divorce case does not have jurisdiction to ter-
minate a parent's residual parental rights. 9'
In J.P. v. Carter,"9 ' the Virginia Court of Appeals made the
following conclusions: (i) the failure of a social worker to con-
182. See id. at 43-44, 497 S.E.2d at 494-95.
183. See Horton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 499 S.E.2d 258 (1998); Bottenfield
v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316, 487 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1997); Mueller v.
Murray, 252 Va. 356, 478 S.E.2d 542 (1996); Mickens v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315,
478 S.E.2d 302 (1996).
184. 22 Va. App. 643, 472 S.E.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1996).
185. See id. at 644-45, 472 S.E.2d at 649.
186. 100 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1996).
187. See id. at 350-51.
188. See White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 740 (4th Cir. 1997).
189. 25 Va. App. 247, 487 S.E.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997).
190. See id. at 254-55, 487 S.E.2d at 288-89.
191. See Church v. Church, 24 Va. App. 502, 508, 483 S.E.2d 498, 501 (Ct. App.
1997).
192. 24 Va. App. 707, 485 S.E.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1997).
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tact an alleged child abuser prior to making an initial determi-
nation of "founded sexual abuse" did not violate due pro-
cess; 93 (ii) a circuit court can properly deny the addition of
evidence not presented at the Department of Social Services
level;"M (iii) any defect in qualifications for an agency hearing
officer did not undermine subject matter jurisdiction;'95 and
(iv) listing a juvenile as an abuser in the child abuse central
registry did not violate the juvenile code." In Carter v.
Ancel, 97 the Virginia Court of Appeals determined that the
department of social services had jurisdiction to act and deter-
mine whether a sexual abuse complaint was "founded," even
though the forty-five days stipulated in Virginia Code section
63.1-248.6(E)(7) had passed.' Criminal acquittals do not act
as a bar for administrative determinations that child abuse or
neglect have occurred and that the person tried and acquitted
was the abuser. 9
Significant administrative action also took place during the
period covered by this article as the Board of Social Services
adopted new child protective services regulations.2' Among
the major changes are that determinations of whether abuse or
neglect complaints are "founded" are to be based on a prepon-
derance of the evidence and not clear and convincing evi-
dence.20 ' New standards are included for interviewing the
child- and the alleged abuser, including a preference for tape re-
cording interviews with children. 0 2 Also, the protective servic-
es worker may request that an alleged abuser who is believed
to be abusing substances submit to substance abuse screening
or a court may be petitioned to order screening.0 3 The last
major change states that, upon the completion of an investiga-
tion, the protective services worker shall give the alleged abus-
193. See id. at 716-17, 485 S.E.2d at 167-68.
194. See id. at 719, 485 S.E.2d at 168-69.
195. See id. at 722, 485 S.E.2d at 170.
196. See id. at 725, 485 S.E.2d at 171-72.
197. 28 Va. App. 76, 502 S.E.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1998).
198. See id. at 79, 502 S.E.2d at 151.
199. See Sesay v. Carter, 43 Va. Cir. 31, 32 (Alexandria City 1997); Danyus v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. Cir. 603, 607 (Newport News City 1992).
200. See 22 VA. ADIN. CODE. 40-705-10 to -190 (1998).
201. See id. at 40-705-10.
202. See id. at 40-705-80.
203. See id. at 40-705-90.
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er notice of any decision to consider the case founded and ad-
vise the person of his or her options.2 4
IV. EDUCATION
Major legislative changes involving education that were en-
acted during the 1997 Session of the Virginia General Assembly
provide greater access to schools for children in homeless shel-
ters. 5 and require school boards to permit the transfer of stu-
dents who have been victims of crime in one school to another
school in the division.2"6 The legislature encouraged the ex-
pansion of programs for at-risk four-year-olds, °7 created the
Virginia Innovative Remedial Education Program,' °s and au-
thorized school boards to create "educational technology foun-
dations" for the purpose of implementing public-private partner-
ships to expand and improve technology in a school division.0 9
Changes also directed the state Board of Education to encour-
age the use of mediation in special education disputes210 and
required students who do not pass the literacy tests to partici-
pate in summer school or some other remediation program.21'
In addition, legislation allowed school boards to eliminate the
right of appeal to the board for student suspensions of ten days
or less and permitted the final decisions to rest with division
superintendents.212 The General Assembly also expanded the
power of teachers to remove "disruptive students" from their
classes and provided that the state board and local school
boards should develop regulations and procedures to govern
these actions.2"3
Other changes to the Virginia Code (i) authorized school
boards to establish a committee of not less than three members
to deal with expulsions and provided for appeal to the full
204. See id. at 40-705-120.
205. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-3 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
206. See id. § 22.1-3.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
207. See id. § 22.1-199.1 (Repl Vol. 1997).
208. See id. § 22.1-209.1:4 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
209. See id. §§ 11-35, 22.1-212.2:2 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
210. See id. § 22.1-214 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
211. See id. §§ 22.1-253.13:1 to .13:4, -254, -254.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
212. See id. §§ 22.1-277, -277.2, -278 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
213. See id. §§ 22.1-276.2, -277, -278 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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board if a decision is not unanimous, 14 (ii) authorized the
suspension or expulsion of students convicted of Drug Control
Act offenses and required juvenile court clerks to report convic-
tions for the gift or distribution of marijuana to division super-
intendents, in addition to the offenses already reported,215 and
(iii) authorized the exclusion from school attendance of students
who have been suspended for more than thirty days and pri-
vate school students for whom admission has been withdrawn
with the provision of some due process safeguards.216
The General Assembly made several other changes that (i)
mandated school safety audits by local school boards;21 (ii)
provided for greater access to school activities by non-custodial
parents in the absence of a contrary court order;2.. (iii) re-
quired school boards to provide information, developed by the
Attorney General's office, to students about the prosecution of
juveniles as adults;219 (iv) allowed parents to access computer-
ized and written school records on their child;' (v) required
school boards to conduct state child abuse and neglect registry
searches for information on all applicants for employment after
July 1, 1997;" 1 and (vi) directed the Departments of Correc-
tions, Correctional Education, and Juvenile Justice to collect
demographic, educational, learning disabilities, health, and oth-
er data on their correctional populations and report these data
annually to the General Assembly.2"
The 1998 legislative year also was an active one for educa-
tion. The General Assembly, among other amendments, enacted
sweeping laws on excellence in public schools. This included
requiring remediation if a student fails any standard of learn-
ing assessment test,' expanding the at-risk four-year-olds
214. See id. § 22.1-277 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
215. See id. § 22.1-277.02 (Repl. Vol. 1997). The suspensions or expulsions may be
for offenses occurring outside of school.
216. See id. § 22.1-277.2 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
217. See id. § 22.1-278.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
218. See id. § 22.1-279.5 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
219. See id.
220. See id. § 22.1-287 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
221. See id. §§ 22.1-296.1 to -296.4 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
222. See id. §§ 22.1-340, 53.1-8, 66-13 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cur. Supp. 1998).
223. See id. §§ 22.1-199.1 to -199.2, -209.1:4, -253.13:1, -253.13:3, -254.01, -278
(Cum. Supp. 1998).
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programs further,' and beginning the process of phasing out
the Literacy Passport testing requirements as set forth in the
Standards of Quality.' The General Assembly established the
Commonwealth Character Initiative to develop character educa-
tion programs," created the Virginia Gifted Education Pilot
Program to provide a model for school divisions,' amended
the Standards of Quality in several respects including techno-
logical proficiency," established Standards of Learning as-
sessment requirements,' and created a number of initiatives
supporting professional training and development among public
school personnel based on recommendations of the Commission
on the Future of Public Education.20
In addition, the General Assembly took the following actions:
(i) provided that notice of a student's absences are to be given
to both parents if they have joint physical custody;"' (ii) mod-,
ified further the hearing procedures for students who have been
suspended for more than ten days, making it comparable to the
1997 amendments regarding expulsion; 2 (iii) directed school
boards to expel any student determined to have brought drugs
onto school property;' (iv) directed the Board of Education
and Office of Attorney General to develop guidelines for school
searches; (v) provided that students for whom reports are
received from juvenile court clerks may be suspended or ex-
pelled from school;' (vi) required local school boards to notify
parents of a student who has been suspended or expelled of
information about the action and about alternative pro-
grams;' and (vii) allowed school principals to -disseminate in-
224. See id. § 22.1-199.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998). This provision is similar to the Gun-
Free Schools provision of VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.01 (Rep. Vol. 1997).
225. See id. §§ 22.1-199.2, -209.1:4, -253.13:1, -253.13:3 to -253.13:4, -254.01" (Cum..
Supp. 1998).
226. See id. § 22.1-208.01 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
227. See id. § 22.1-209.1:5 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
228. See id. § 22.1-253.13:1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
229. See id. § 22.1-253.13:3 (Cur. Supp. 1998).
230. See id. §§ 22.1-253.13:5, -298 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
231. See id. § 22.1-258 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
232. See id. § 22.1-277 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
233. See id. § 22.1-277.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
234. See id. §§ 22.1-277.01:1 to -277.01:2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
235. See id. §§ 22.1-277.02, -277.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
236. See id. § 22.1-277.03 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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formation received from a juvenile court clerk about the convic-
tion of a student to those school personnel with a legitimate
educational interest in the information. 7
The General Assembly also enacted a charter school bill after
several years of attempts, authorizing local school divisions to
establish two charter schools per school division, one of which
must enhance opportunities for at-risk students." This bill
provided that admission will be through a lottery process, re-
quiring schools to meet or exceed the Standards of Quality and
to be subject to all Standards of Accreditation requirements 9
The bill further defined the schools so as to be tuition-free,
nonsectarian, non-religious, and non-home-based alternative
educational institutions.' °
In another significant legislative development in 1997, Con-
gress amended the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). The changes were substantive and sweeping." There
is not sufficient space in this article to discuss all the chang-
es, 2 but the major changes affect such matters as eligibility,
evaluation, development of individualized education programs
(IEPs), public and private placements, discipline, funding,
attorney's fees, resolution of disputes, and procedural safe-
guards for students and their parents. The legislation will be
supplemented by extensive regulations, which have been issued
only in draft form at this time.'
The United States Supreme Court decided two education-
based cases during the 1996-1998 period. The first, Agostini v.
Felton,' overruled the landmark cases of Aguilar v.
Felton245 and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 6 by
237. See id. § 22.1-288.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
238. See id. § 22.1-212.11(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
239. See id. §§ 22.1-212.5 to -212.15 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
240. See id.
241. See Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-21) (West Supp. 1998)).
242. For further discussion, see Dawn Snow Huefner, The Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 1103 (1998).
243. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55066-55130 (1997) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300-03)
(proposed Oct. 22, 1997).
244. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
245. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
246. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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ruling that public school teachers could be sent into sectarian
schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children
under title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965. 7
The second case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,' made it considerably more difficult for sexually
abused students to recover damages against school districts. A
divided court determined that school districts are not liable to
the student or family unless the district had actual notice of
the abuse and then failed to act.
Virginia cases included the following: (i) Wall v. Fairfax
County School Board, 9 where the Supreme Court of Virginia
decided that school student election results are exempt from
disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act; °
(ii) Virginia High School League v. J.J. Kelly High School,"'
where the supreme court concluded that the league violated its
own by-laws when it re-classified the high school for sports
competitions and other purposes; and (iii) Wood v. Henry Coun-
ty Public Schools, 2 where the supreme court determined that
the school system did not violate Wood's due process rights in
disciplinary proceedings, which arose from his bringing a pocket
knife on a school field trip. The court did, however, conclude
that a pocket knife is not a "firearm" within the meaning of the
appropriate statutes, and its possession cannot lead to the auto-
matic expulsion of at least one yearY3 In McMahon v.
Randolph-Macon Academy,' a circuit court judge ruled that a
private boarding school that takes a minor into its custody has
an in loco parentis relationship with that student. This rela-
tionship creates certain fiduciary duties, and "where a choice
exists between the interests of a staff member and the best
interests of a student ... the school must choose to act in the
student's best interest."25
247. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
248. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
249. 252 Va. 156, 475 S.E.2d 803 (1996).
250. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
251. 254 Va. 528, 493 S.E.2d 362 (1997).
252. 255 Va. 85, 495 S.E.2d 255 (1998).
253. See id. at 93, 495 S.E.2d at 260.
254. 42 Va. Cir. 417 (Warren County 1997).
255. Id. at 419.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
made the following rulings: (i) upheld the constitutionality of a
school district's rule which required high school students to per-
form fifty hours of community service prior to graduation;2"
(ii) ruled that Virginia's plan for educating disabled students
under the IDEA qualifies the state for federal funding in spite
of allowing school districts to discontinue providing an educa-
tion to disabled students who are suspended or expelled for
disciplinary reasons; 7 (iii) reversed a district court decision
and concluded that the district court judge had the power to
order the state department of education to pay private school
costs of a disabled student for violation of the IDEA; 5 (iv)
ruled that under the IDEA a regular school classroom would
not be the least restrictive environment for an autistic student
who had made no progress in that setting; 9 (v) agreed with
the administrative review hearing officer and district court
judge that a youth with major behavior problems was not suf-
fering from a serious emotional disturbance and, thus, was not
disabled under the IDEA;26° (vi) concluded in a sharply split
en banc holding that a play performed by high school students
under the direction of a drama teacher is part of the school
curriculum which is subject to the control of school administra-
tors and, thus, does not implicate the teacher's First Amend-
ment rights;26 and (vii) decided that parents of a disabled
student could not recover damages from the school board for
failing to diagnose the youth and to provide services.2"2
In Austin v. Lambert,2" a federal district court ruled that
assistant principals at a public high school had qualified immu-
nity from a damages claim for conducting a body search of a
male student for drugs. The decision was based partially in
light of what the district judge perceived as the absence of
256. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th ir.
1996).
257. See Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), superseded by
statute as stated in Amos v. Megland, 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997).
258. See Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940 (4th Cir. 1997).
259. See Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1997).
260. See Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998).
261. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
262. See Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).
263. No. 97-0465-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8062, at *1 (W.D. Va. 1998).
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definitive case law on the subject of student searches in schools.
The student in this case had his pants removed and a search
was conducted of his person, allegedly in front of a full-length
window where he was visible to passersby.2
V. MISCELLANEOUS
The most significant legislative action for this section in 1997
was the adoption of the parental notification abortion statute
that came after persistent attempts over a number of years.2"
The statute provides that no doctor may perform an abortion
upon an unemancipated minor unless notice is given to a par-
ent, guardian, or some other person having custody of the mi-
nor, or unless a court order has been entered authorizing the
abortion without parental notice.2" The physician may go for-
ward without notice if the minor claims to be abused or neglec-
ted.67 If the physician has reason to suspect that the minor
has been abused or neglected and the minor makes a com-
plaint, the physician may go forward without notice if the abor-
tion is medically necessary to avert the girl's death or if there
is insufficient time to give notice or utilize the judicial bypass
procedure because of serious medical risks.'
In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, the minor
may secure an abortion without parental notice only by seeking
a judicial bypass through filing a petition with a juvenile
court."9 The judge must then order a hearing to determine
whether the minor is mature, or if not, whether the perfor-
mance of an abortion without notice would be in her best inter-
est.Y7 The statute provides that if a determination is made
that the minor is mature, the judge "may" authorize the abor-
tion without notice.27'
264. See id. at *3-6, 11.
265. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
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If the abortion is in the minor's best interest, the judge
"shall" authorize the abortion.272 The discretionary language
under the "mature minor" provision was a principal basis for
the constitutional attack on the statute. Prior to the effective
date of the statute, a federal district judge granted a prelimi-
nary injunction which was then stayed by a single circuit judge.
That stay was affirmed by the full federal circuit court.113 Af-
ter more than a year, the court, sitting en banc, upheld the
constitutionality of the statute by concluding that the language
permitting the exercise of discretion is not an unconstitutional
provision for a parental notification statute, as opposed to a
parental consent statute.274 Although the decision was unani-
mous, a number of the concurring judges joined in the judg-
ment by viewing "may" as meaning "must."275
An article in The Washington Post in the Spring of 1998 indi-
cated that teen-aged girls in Virginia obtained about twenty
percent fewer abortions in the first five months after the law
went into effect than during the same period in the year be-
fore.276 Although this reduction could be attributed to a drop
in abortions generally in the state and in the nation, interviews
indicated that a number of pregnant young women were leaving
the state to have abortions elsewhere.277 For example, there
appeared to be a definite increase in inquiries from Virginia to
national abortion "hot lines" and to clinics in the District of
Columbia.27' Data for the first year of the law indicate that
thirty-one judicial bypass cases were filed in Virginia juvenile
courts and twenty-seven of them resulted in approval of the
teenaged petitioner's request.27 9
272. See id.
273. See Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.
1997), affd, 125 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
274. See Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camnblos, 155 F.3d 352, 355 (4th
Cir. 1998) (en banc).
275. See id. at 385 (Widener, J., concurring).
276. Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions in Virginia, THE WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at Al.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REPORT, ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDIcIAL BYPASS
PROCEEDINGS (July 1, 1997-June 30, 1998). In addition to the 27 petitions granted by
the Virginia juvenile courts, one petition was granted on appeal. See id.
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In 1998, the General Assembly passed a "Standby Guardian-
ship Act" after a year-long study by the Commission on
Youth." Under the Act, a parent with a progressive and
chronic illness, such as AIDS, can name an individual to as-
sume temporary care of a child without the drastic remedy of a
termination of residual parental rights."8 The standby guard-
ian can be appointed by the juvenile court or be designated
more informally by the parent in writing. 2 The guardian's
authority will be activated by some "triggering event" specified
by the court order or by the parent, such as the parent's incom-
petence or debilitation.' The court also has the power to re-
view the continuation of the standby guardianship and to re-
voke or otherwise terminate it.' The guardian is allocated
responsibility to ensure that permanent arrangements are made
for the care of the child when the parent is no longer capable
of doing so.
Legislation in 1997 gave guardians ad litem access to medical
and mental health records upon presentation of a court order
and, upon at least seventy-two hours notice, the ability to con-
sult with a mental health provider to review and interpret the
child's treatment records.' The General Assembly clarified
that the statute of limitations in lawsuits arising out of child
sexual abuse is subject to the "discovery" accrual rule when the
plaintiff is not previously aware of the abuse.' It also prohib-
ited the tattooing of minors without a parent or guardian's
presence, unless done under the supervision of licensed medical
personnel 7 and provided that drivers transporting children at
least four years old but younger than sixteen ensure that they
are provided and secured with seat belts.' In 1998, the Gen-
eral Assembly also enacted legislation allowing either or both of
a minor's parents to sue on behalf of the child as next
280. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA COMISSION ON YOUTH ON STUDY OF STANDBY
GUARDIANSHIP TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, S. Doc.
No. 20 (1998).
281. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-349 to -355 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
282. See id. §§ 16.1-349, -350(A) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
283. See id.
284. See id. § 16.1-354 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
285. See id. § 16.1-266(E) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
286. See id. § 8.01-249 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
287. See id. § 18.2-371.3 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
288. See id. § 46.2-1095 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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friend 9 and exempted minors holding a valid driver's license
issued by some other state from the requirement that they
receive their Virginia license from a juvenile court in a formal
ceremony.'
The United States Supreme Court decided an historic case in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.9' in which the Com-
munications Decency Act was ruled to be a violation of the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech for adults in its
attempt to make it a federal crime for "content providers" to
send "indecent" words or pictures to minors in cyberspace.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed significant issues
in Williams v. Williams,29' decided in three very .different
opinions but with a fairly narrow holding. All of the justices
concluded that grandparents could not successfully petition a
court for visitation rights over the objection of both parents in
an intact family." In the Virginia Court of Appeals, the same
conclusion was based on broader and stronger language about
the fundamental nature of parents' rights that conceivably could
have had significant implications for the protection of children
in the abuse and neglect arena and for decision-making by
school officials and other public officials."
In the field of negligence law, the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled in Pavlick v. Pavlick" that the normal rule granting
immunity from suit for most intra-family acts of negligence
does not apply to an unemancipated minor who is injured or
killed by a parent through an allegedly intentional tortious
act.29 In A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing Company,"9 the
Supireme Court of Virginia concluded that a publisher had no
duty to warn a minor newspaper carrier of the risk of sexual
assault even though three prior carriers had been assaulted
289. See id. § 8.01-8 (Cur. Supp. 1998).
290. See id. § 46.2-336 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
291. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
292. See id. at 2347-48.
293. 256 Va. 19, 501 S.E.2d 417 (1998).
294. See id. at 19, 501 S.E.2d at 417.
295. See Williams v. Williams, 24 Va. App. 778, 781-82, 485 S.E.2d 651, 653-54
(Ct. App. 1997).
296. 254 Va. 176, 491 S.E.2d 602 (1997).
297. See id. at 182, 491 S.E.2d at 605.
298. 255 Va. 216, 495 S.E.2d 482 (1998).
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over a five-year period. The court reasoned that the prior as-
saults were neither geographically proximate to the assault on
the plaintiff, nor had they occurred with sufficient frequency or
closeness in time to make an assault of the plaintiff reasonably
foreseeable.' In Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach,"° how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the action of the
circuit court by striking a nuisance count in a lawsuit and set-
ting aside a jury verdict for parents on a gross negligence claim
where an eight-year-old girl was killed while playing on a bro-
ken gate giving access to the boardwalk. The court agreed with
the trial court that the boardwalk was a recreational facility
requiring proof of gross negligence, but disagreed with setting
aside the jury verdict." 1 The court overturned the striking of
the nuisance count and found error in the admission of expert
testimony on whether the condition of the gate created a dan-
gerous condition and in the giving of an instruction on the
contributory negligence of the mother. 2
In Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,"3 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia found that a thirteen-year-old boy was
barred from successfully suing for injuries suffered in an auto-
mobile accident where he freely consented and participated in
the illegal act of being driven by a sixteen-year-old who was not
licensed to drive the car."' The court also concluded that the
rebuttable presumption of incapacity for a child under fourteen
in criminal cases does not apply to the illegality defense in a
negligence action although the proof of consent "necessarily
includes consideration of the maturity, intelligence, and mental
capacity of the plaintiff, regardless of age." 5 In litigation
arising out of injuries suffered by a child who ingested lead-.
based paint in rented property, the Supreme Court of Virginia
299. See id. at 222-23, 495 S.E.2d at 486.
300. 252 Va. 186, 475 S.E.2d 798 (1996).
301. See id. at 186-87, 475 S.E.2d at 800-01.
302. See id. at 191-92, 475 S.E.2d at 801-02.
303. 255 Va. 279, 497 S.E.2d 328 (1998).
304. See id. at 284-85, 497 S.E.2d at 330.
305. Id. at 283, 497 S.E.2d at 330. The court implicitly recognized the continued
viability of the infancy or age incapacity defense in criminal or delinquency proceed-
ings by its opinion in the case.
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upheld an insurance company's health hazard exclusion clause
in the policy insuring the landlord."6
In two circuit court opinions, the courts ruled that punitive
damages were not recoverable by parents for ordinary or gross
negligence claims against a child care facility, especially where
there was no evidence of willful and wanton conduct.0 7 In ad-
dition, the courts ruled that the parents could not recover for
loss of consortium of a child in Virginia.0 8 Furthermore, the
courts held that the parents' claim for reimbursement of medi-
cal expenses incurred by their child as a result of the alleged
negligence of another, although derivative, was not protected by
the tolling provision of the statute of limitations." In
Hutchins v. Carillo,31° the Virginia Court of Appeals conclud-
ed that a father was deprived of due process when he lost his
right to appeal a juvenile court's order concerning child custody
and support because the clerk's office was improperly closed on
the last day to file an appeal bond.'
Two 1997 cases addressed the competency of child witnesses.
In Greenway v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia concluded that an inadequate foundation had been laid for
testimony by a twelve-year-old about the speed of an automo-
bile in an involuntary manslaughter case."3 In Braxton v.
Commonwealth,"4  a three-year-old's out-of-court statement
about his mother's murder was deemed to have been admitted
properly as an excited utterance. 15 The child was dazed, visi-
bly distressed, clearly under the influence of the acts, and spea-
king spontaneously in reaction to a startling event.31 6
306. See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Baecher, 252 Va. 347, 477 S.E.2d 490 (1996).
307. See Cocoli v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 589p 591-92,
594 (Fairfax County 1994).
308. See id.
309. See Mays v. Rockingham Mem' Hosp., 42 Va. Cir. 19, 20 (Rockingham Coun-
ty 1996).
310. 27 Va. App. 595, 500 S.E.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1998).
311. See id. at 613, 500 S.E.2d at 286.
312. 254 Va. 147, 487 S.E.2d 224 (1997).
313. See id. at 153-54, 487 S.E.2d at 227-28.
314. 26 Va. App. 176, 493 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1997).
315. See id. at 182-84, 993 S.E.2d at 691-93.
316. See id. at 184, 993 S.E.2d at 692.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The past two years have seen the continued development of a
body of law concerning children, but the pace slowed a bit,
especially in the field of juvenile justice. The General Assembly
quite wisely decided to allow the juvenile justice system a de-
gree of repose to allow for some evaluation of the reforms
adopted in 1994 and 1996. Unfortunately, no formal process for
conducting such an evaluation or assessment was put in place.
Although there was some anecdotal evidence that
Commonwealth's Attorneys across the state were not deviating
significantly from pre-1996 practices in determining which juve-
niles to try as adults during the first year after passage of the
legislation, with a few geographic exceptions. Similar evidence
indicates that there may be important changes in that early
trend. More juveniles now seem to be facing adult prosecution
in Virginia. The trends and practices should be studied with
some care to determine what is happening, how and why, espe-
cially as the incidence of serious juvenile crime continues to
drop. It also is ironic that as adolescents are being held more
accountable for their acts in the criminal justice system, and at
a younger age, they are being afforded less discretion in serious
matters such as abortion or in less serious areas such as being
tattooed.
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